Published: Erkenntnis 78, 299–320, 2013.
Hall has recently argued that there are two concepts of causality, picking out two different kinds of causal relation. McGrath, and Hitchcock and Knobe, have recently argued that the facts about causality depend on what counts as a
normal state, or even on the moral facts. In the light of these claims you might be tempted to agree with Skyrms that causal relations constitute, metaphysically speaking, an
amiable jumble, or with Cartwright that
causation, though a single word, encompasses many different kinds of things. This paper argues, drawing on the author's recent work on explanation, that the evidence adduced in support of causal pluralism can be accommodated easily by a unified theory of causality—a theory according to which all singular causal claims concern the same fundamental causal network.
This paper also serves as a summary of my theory of singular causation.
PDF version: Causality Reunified.