In order to understand causal claims of the form "A was a cause of B", we need, I think, to understand explanation. Conversely, a good account of explanation will provide all the insight we need into the truth conditions for causal claims. In the course of my work on scientific explanation, I found myself with an account of causal claims.
- Causality Reunified. Forthcoming, Erkenntnis.
- Why Represent Causal Relations? A. Gopnik and L. Schulz (eds.), Causal Learning: Psychology, Philosophy, Computation, Oxford University Press, New York, 2007.
- Mackie Remixed. Topics in Contemporary Philosophy, vol. 4, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2007.
- Against Lewis's New Theory of Causation. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84, 398–412, 2003.
Discussion of the Manipulability Account
- Essay review of Woodward, Making Things Happen. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 74:233–249, 2007.
- Comments on Woodward, Making Things Happen. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 77:171–192, 2008.
- Causal Claims. (An account of the truth conditions for causal claims.)